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 Short covering trades 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Short sellers are known to have private information about security prices. Empirical evidence of 
short selling, however, is based on only half of short sellers’ trading activity; specifically, the 
opening of the position. Using disclosed large short position data from the Japanese stock 
market, we provide the first detailed evidence of covering trades and find a positive reaction to 
short covering that only partially reverses. While these results are consistent with substantial 
transaction costs for closing large short positions, they also reveal that some short sellers are 
privately informed about positive future events and have timing ability in covering positions. 
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1.  Introduction 
Short-sales are considered economically important trades that are essential for providing 
liquidity and distilling information in the market (Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008; Boehmer 
and Wu, 2013; Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009; Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg, 2012; 
Massa, Zhang, and Zhang, 2014). Yet, data limitations still constrain our understanding of short 
sellers’ trading strategies. A short-sale transaction consists of at least two opposing trades: one 
involving the actual short-sale and one in which the short seller purchases shares to cover the 
position.
1
 Although conventional wisdom ascribes substantial positive price impact to covering 
trades, existing analyses of short selling focus exclusively on the trade that establishes the short 
position.    
Trades covering large short positions are possibly associated with transient, positive returns 
that reflect the temporary price impact of large buy orders. In addition, covering trades may also 
convey new information. Short sellers are expected to cover their trades when the overvaluation 
has been corrected or new private information indicates undervaluation. Thus, stock prices 
should not further decline after covering trades. However, short-sale constraints may alter the 
price behavior around short coverings. When adverse price movement or securities lending 
market constraints force short sellers to cover the positions prematurely, stock prices can 
continue to decline after the coverings (Jarrow, 1992; Lamont and Stein, 2004; Savor and 
Gamboa-Cavazos, 2014).  
Interestingly, to our knowledge, the overall market impact of short covering trades remains 
an open empirical question because we lack detailed positions information. Our study addresses 
                                                          
1
 When naked shorting is prohibited, in addition to the sell and buy in trades, an underlying securities 
lending/borrowing transaction facilitates the delivery of the stocks sold by short sellers. The availability of the 
shares and the cost of the borrowing are generally considered direct short-sale constraints (Autore, Boulton, and 
Braga-Alves, 2015; Jones and Lamont, 2002; Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2011).  
2 
 
this shortcoming in the literature by providing the first comprehensive analysis of short 
coverings using a previously unexplored dataset containing reports on short sellers’ positions in 
stocks listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). Since November 7, 2008, the Japanese 
Financial Securities Authority has mandated disclosures of short positions in excess of 0.25% of 
the total shares outstanding for all TSE listed stocks.
2
 We hand-collected data on all disclosed 
large positions from November 11, 2008, when the data were first available, until September 30, 
2010. Our sample consists of 4,133 reported positions in 889 stocks during a period in which 
short selling was prevalent in the Japanese stock market.  
We first examine the stock performance around large cover trades and find significant 
positive return effects. Using regression analyses, we find that the excess return is 0.32% on the 
day of the covering trade. However, a third to a quarter of the return is reversed during the 
subsequent trading week, consistent with the transient liquidity effect (Hasbrouck, 1991). The 
remaining persistent positive return effect provides evidence of trade innovation from short 
sellers’ withdrawal. Thus, short sellers not only have negative private information when 
establishing short positions as documented in the literature, we show that they also use positive 
private information in covering trades. 
We further analyze positive returns after the covering trades by considering heterogeneity 
among short sellers. While on average short sellers are informed investors, certain shorts may be 
unprofitable if adverse price movement forces the positions to be covered. Moreover, whereas 
                                                          
2  In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, a number of exchanges introduced disclosure regimes requiring short 
sellers with a net short position above a certain threshold to disclose their position, as long as the position is not 
closed out or significantly reduced. Although the threshold requirement varies across countries, most exchanges 
require the disclosure of large short positions exceeding 0.20% or 0.25%. Some markets limit the disclosures to 
financial firms or other specific securities, while many report only the total outstanding shorts or the total number 
of shares on loan at some regular interval.  
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conventional short sellers profit when stock prices decline, some short positions may be part of 
arbitrage or hedging strategy and are not motivated by significant overvaluation.   
We address heterogeneity among short sellers by using variation in position returns and by 
considering the aggregate shorting in the specific stocks. We find that the significant positive 
returns up to six months after the covering trades are robust among the better performing large 
short positions. These results are consistent with the framework of Easley and O’Hara (1987) 
stating that informed traders are more willing to trade large positions, and short sellers who 
successfully identify overvalued stocks efficiently time the covering of the position before price 
run-up, thus evading dilution of their trading profits. Furthermore, we show that covering trades 
for stocks with lower aggregate shorting have higher post-covering returns. Since short sellers, as 
a group, are generally considered informed traders, the covering of one specific large disclosed 
short position conveys a more positive signal to the market when it agrees with the group’s 
opinion.   
We also consider the role of short-sale constraints in covering trades. Although we find that 
the reported large short positions are generally covered following return run-up, we find no 
evidence of a large systematic return decline after coverings. Within our sample of stocks with 
large disclosed short positions, the lending fees and supply constraints have no material effect on 
the closure and are also not important in explaining the cross-sectional differences in post-
covering returns. This finding suggests that adverse market conditions do not force most short 
sellers in our sample to cover. 
Last, we differentiate between the various types of institutions and show that brokerage firms 
are more efficient than other institutions in covering positions before large return run-up. This 
finding implies that either highly informed short sellers use brokerages to conceal their identities 
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or that the brokerage’s proprietary trading desks, with better access to time-sensitive market 
information and effective internal research, place more efficiently timed covering trades.  
In addition to examining returns, we explore the underlying determinants for the duration of 
large short trades by estimating a Cox proportional hazard model for the exit (cover decision) of 
short sellers. We find that on any given day, an open short position is more likely to be covered 
when liquidity improves, share turnover increases, the position becomes more profitable, or the 
aggregate short selling in the stock declines. The effects of turnover and liquidity are as 
expected: short sellers in our sample are large traders, so they would logically seek liquid, active 
periods to conduct their covering trades. Profit taking and the relation of individual covering 
trades to aggregate shorting levels both indicate that strategic decisions and considerations of 
other short sellers’ behavior at least partially determine covering trades.  
Overall, we offer two contributions to the short-sale literature. First, we provide systematic 
analyses of covering trades for large short positions using a unique hand-collected database, and 
show that on average there is significant positive transient and permanent price impacts 
associated with these trades. We suggest that this information should be considered in 
conjunction with the negative returns associated with the opening of the short positions when 
interpreting the net market impact of short-sales. Second, we provide new insights regarding 
short sellers’ timing ability, a crucial trading skill largely overlooked in the short-sale literature. 
We show that large shorts are covered efficiently with small price impacts, after mispricing is 
corrected or before large price run-ups occur.  
 
5 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. Literature review 
Short-sale studies find that short sellers, on average, are informed traders who can predict future 
bond yield spreads (e.g., Kecskés, Mansi, and Zhang, 2013) and stock returns (e.g., Asquith, 
Pathak, and Ritter, 2005; Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran, 2002; Diether et al., 
2009), and facilitate price discovery (e.g., Boehmer and Wu, 2013). While short sellers, as a 
group, are considered to be informed and skilled traders, there is heterogeneity across the traders 
and the information content of their trades. For example, among the institutional shorts, the non-
program institutional traders’ positions are associated with the most negative future returns 
(Boehmer et al., 2008). Moreover, other than overvaluation, motivations for short selling include 
tax, arbitrage, and hedging. Brent, Morse, and Stice (1990), using a subsample of NYSE stocks, 
show that arbitrage is the most prevalent reason. In a set of complementary findings, Choi, 
Getmansky, and Tookes (2009) provide evidence of active short selling in the convertible bond 
market and suggest that short sellers are essential for price discovery in the market. Still, the 
academic consensus is that short sellers, as a group, trade on stock specific valuation, short 
overvalued stocks, and carefully avoid shorting undervalued ones (Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan, 
2010). 
Short-sale studies that focus on the pricing implications of short-sale constraints show that 
mispricing can persist when shorting is restricted or too costly (Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu, 2007; 
Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2011). In many cases, short sellers may be unable to correct overvaluation 
because limited supply, high lending fees, or adverse market conditions restrict short selling. For 
example, high market sentiment can push already overpriced stock prices to an even higher level 
(Lamont and Stein, 2004), a result consistent with the findings of Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan 
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(2012) that the anomalies are stronger on the short side following high sentiment because capital 
constraints prevent arbitrageurs on the short side from effectively correcting mispricing. To 
make matters worse for short sellers, they can be squeezed out by manipulative traders who 
instigate large buy-ups and profit from the temporary positive price impacts (Jarrow, 1992). In a 
recent study, Jank, Roling and Smajlbegovic (2016) also argue that transparency requirements of 
short positions can be a short-sale constraint and have pricing implications. 
Although the short-sale literature generally agrees that short sellers have stock-picking ability 
and can identify overvalued stocks, little attention has been paid to their heterogeneity and 
timing ability. Three notable exceptions are Boehmer et al. (2008), Jones, Reed, and Waller 
(2015), and Jank and Smajlbegovic (2015). Boehmer et al. (2008) use unique trade level data to 
differentiate across traders at the opening of the short-sale, but cannot capture the entire position 
or provide insights about the covering trades. Jones et al. (2015) rely on daily disclosed large 
short positions in excess of a specific reporting threshold on European Exchanges and show that 
during the European debt crisis, short sellers focused on financial firms, particularly around 
rights issuance. Similarly, Jank and Smajlbegovic (2015) examine the disclosed large short 
positions in Europe and find that hedge funds have more profitable positions than do other short 
sellers.  
While recent studies use unique data to provide new information about short strategies, they 
still predominantly focus on the opening of the trade. Jank and Smajlbegovic (2015) analyze 
realized profits but capture only the fraction of the position above a certain threshold rather than 
the full short position. More important, the market impact of the trade closure is still largely 
ignored. If the decision regarding when to cover the short position is based on private 
information, the associated price impact can affect the interpretation of the preceding negative 
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price adjustment, which supposedly makes the price more accurate. Moreover, if short-sale 
constraints play a role in covering decisions, short sellers can be good stock pickers but not 
necessarily good market timers.  
2.2. Hypotheses  
Conventional wisdom among traders ascribes a strong positive price effect to covering trades 
that could change the interpretation of earlier results. In particular, a robust positive price 
reaction to a covering trade may offset the initial negative impact associated with establishing the 
short position. This would imply that the effect of short selling is partly transient, rather than 
permanent, and thus not information-based. We empirically test this prediction in the first 
hypothesis:   
H1: Short coverings are associated with positive returns.  
In the short term, positive transient price impact is expected in the absence of the arrival of new 
information, because of the coverings of large short positions. Two factors contribute to the 
transient price impact. First, the covering trade is large because the short position is at least 
0.25% of the shares outstanding, while the average daily turnover for shorted stocks is 0.57%. 
Second, the market knows the size of each trader’s short position from the public notifications 
and can exploit that information once the trader is expected to start covering. Both uninformed 
trading and order anticipation trading can create a positive return around the covering date, 
which is reversed once liquidity is replenished. Whether covering trades are contrarian is unclear 
because short sellers do not face requirements to trade passively in covering trades as they would 
for the actual shorting transaction in markets with uptick rule for short selling. 
Next, we analyze long-term impacts regarding the trade innovation component of the return 
following covering (Hasbrouck, 1991). To shed light on the information component of the 
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covering trades, we consider the question: Do short sellers strategically close their positions or 
are they forced? We differentiate between the two outcomes for coverings with hypotheses H2A 
and H2B.  
H2A: Short sellers exploit privileged information sources, resulting in coverings once 
overpricing is corrected.  
Significant price decline generally follows large short trades or large increases in the aggregate 
shorting demand (Boehmer et al., 2008; Diether et al., 2009). These results suggest that short 
sellers initiating these trades possess private information or can process information more rapidly 
and efficiently (Engelberg et al., 2012). In general, if short sellers are considered relatively 
informed by being able to identify overvalued stocks, they should be able to determine when the 
mispricing is corrected and effectively time their trades. In the absence of external constraints for 
short sellers, we specifically argue that at the time of the covering, stocks should be either 
correctly priced or underpriced if new information arrived while the trader held the position. 
However, adverse market conditions may cause a different outcome, leading to our second, 
competing hypothesis.  
H2B: Short sellers are forced to close out positions prematurely; thus, stock prices have 
a persistent downward trajectory following short coverings.  
Three main factors could force short sellers to leave money on the table and prematurely close 
out positions: (1) adverse price movements (large losses or manipulative traders’ short squeeze 
makes the short position too expensive to maintain), (2) short-sale constraints from the securities 
lending market, or (3) behavioral biases. Specifically, positive price jumps would trigger margin 
calls for the short sellers, which could make the position too costly to maintain and force the 
short seller to cover the position, at least partially, to reduce the costs or generate cash to meet 
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the margin call. If the overpricing has not been fully corrected after a transient price jump, the 
stock price will continue to decline until it converges to fundamentals. 
The price impact of forced covering from securities lending market conditions and behavioral 
biases are similar. Short sellers may not close out the specific unprofitable position affected by 
short-sale constraints; instead, the well-known disposition effect may cause them to close the 
more profitable one (Massa and von Beschwitz, 2014). This would generate a substitution effect 
within the portfolio of the short sellers and would impede our ability to empirically examine the 
link between short-sale constraints and the premature closing of short positions.   
In addition to the market impact of short coverings, we also aim to provide new insight into 
the duration of short-sale trades. Specifically, we ask: What determines the cover decisions and 
the duration of the short position? This allows us to compare our findings with previous work 
showing that short sellers are contrarians (Diether et al., 2009), informed when they initiate 
trades (Boehmer et al., 2008), and have trades that are followed by negative price adjustments 
that make prices more informationally efficient (Boehmer and Wu, 2013).   
3. Data and descriptive statistics  
3.1. Sample construction  
Since November 7, 2008, the Japanese Financial Securities Authority has required all individual 
and institutional short sellers to disclose large short positions that exceed 0.25% of the shares 
outstanding for a stock. Short sellers must report any changes in their aggregate position above 
the threshold, including covering transactions that reduce their position to below the threshold. 
Thus, the reports fail to tell when the position first opened. They indicate only when the most 
recent short-sales pushed a trader’s overall short position over the reporting limit. Shorts and 
covers are reported as long as the position exceeds the threshold; therefore, the last reported 
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covering trade could, in principle, leave a substantial position below the threshold. This 
limitation prevented us from estimating the actual returns of short positions because the return in 
the buildup and wind-down may not be reported.  
We combined the daily reports released by the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) between 
November 11, 2008, the date of the first large short position report, and September 30, 2010, to 
create a panel of large daily institutional short positions. Overall, 176 institutions report at least 
one large short position in excess of 0.25% of the total shares outstanding, resulting in 4,832 
disclosed short positions. To reduce noise in the data, we excluded infrequently trading 
institutions and organizations (such as Buddhist temples or small businesses) that reported fewer 
than twenty positions during the sample period. 
Our final sample comprises thirty-one institutions, including well-known international 
securities and asset management firms such as Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank Securities, 
and Japanese brokerage houses such as Nomura Securities or Mitsubishi UFJ. The reports 
accounted for more than 85% of the total reported positions (4,133 of 4,832 positions). 
Furthermore, the institutions in our sample reported short positions in 889 stocks, a significant 
fraction of the 920 distinct stocks that have at least one report in the original data, including 
infrequent trading institutions. Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix show the monthly time series of 
the total large short positions captured in the data and the thirty-one institutions with the relevant 
summary statistics of their positions.  
The TSE requires that short position reports are filed by day t+2 relative to the trade date t. 
About 16% of the reports, however, are one day early; 3% are one day late; and 1% are filed on 
the trade day. Thus, for about 80% of the reports, the actual trading day is two days before the 
report day. This timeline is important for properly interpreting the price movements around the 
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reporting dates. Finally, for 28 of 4,133 reports, the trade date is not included in the filings. For 
these reports, we assume that the trade takes place two days before the reporting date.  
To control for aggregate shorting, we use the number of shares out on loan from Data 
Explorers (now Markit Securities Finance). To construct a measure of shorting difficulty, we use 
the number of shares available for lending relative to the shares outstanding. We complement our 
dataset with daily stock prices, trading volume, daily return, and annual financial information 
from Factset (e.g., sales, asset, book value, and institutional ownership). 
3.2. Descriptive statistics  
Figure 1 shows the time trend of the aggregate market shorting and the total reported shorting 
activity in Japan during our sample period. In Panel A, the outstanding total value of short 
positions was approximately JPY 2.2 trillion, while the market value of the reported large short 
positions was about JPY 250 billion.
3
  Overall, we have 4,133 positions in the sample, and on 
average, at any point in time, about 250 positions are open with about 180 new openings and 
closures per month. The data collection began on November 11, 2008, so a peak of 301 reported 
positions occurred during the first month. Smaller numbers are listed for the total and new 
positions for the last months because we exclude positions not closed out by September 2010. 
(Table 1 in the Appendix provides more details about the time series of the position coverage.)  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Of the 1,570 TSE-listed stocks in our sample, 920 have at least one short report. Of those 920 
stocks, 31 are shorted only by inactive institutions and are excluded from the sample. The 
                                                          
3
 During the corresponding period, the average daily turnover on TSE was 2.7 trillion, and the total market 
capitalization about JPY307 trillion. The total shorted value is approximated by the total value of the stocks out on 
loan, as reported by Markit securities. Although stocks are borrowed for various reasons, most common is to 
facilitate short selling in the presence of prohibited naked short selling. Thus stocks on loan are often used as 
proxies for short selling.  
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remaining 889 stocks are shorted at least once by an active institutional short seller. Table 1 
shows characteristics of these stocks contrasted with those that do not appear in any report. 
Annual variables are in Panel A, and daily variables are in Panel B. 
[Table 1 about here]  
Market capitalization does not differ significantly between stocks with large disclosed 
positions and those without. However, the shorted stocks tend to have higher institutional 
ownership, lower insider holding, and higher market-to-book ratio. Panel B of Table 1 shows the 
daily characteristics for both groups. Stocks with large reported short positions trade more 
actively and are more liquid, as reflected by lower bid-ask spreads. During our entire sample 
period, the aggregate disclosed large shorts (InstSIR) is 0.187% among stocks that have at least 
one reported large short position, implying that, on average, 0.187% of the total shares 
outstanding are shorted in large positions (InstSIR is zero for any day that a stock is not shorted 
in a large position).  
In addition, we compute several measures of aggregate shorting using information from 
Markit Securities. Percentage of total shares available for borrowing (Supply) is a widely 
considered short-sale constraint measure (Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2011). AggSIR measures 
aggregate shorting activity in the market by calculating the total number of borrowed shares as a 
percentage of the total shares outstanding. Not surprisingly, stocks included in the hand-collected 
sample have significantly higher aggregate shorting activity and are also easier to short (have 
greater Supply). 
In Table 2 we present detailed summary statistics of our data because previous academic 
research has not used large disclosed short positions. In Panel A of Table 2, we report that the 
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mean (median) position value in the sample is ¥633 million (¥246 million).
4
 On an average day, 
traders report short positions in 259 stocks. Our sample is drawn from the first section of the TSE 
with approximately 1,600 stocks, so positions are typically reported on about 20% of the stocks 
on any given day. The average daily raw and market-adjusted returns are 8.20 bps and 7.10 bps, 
respectively. We use Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX), a capitalization-weighted index of all 
companies listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, to proxy for the market 
return. Market adjusted returns are calculated by subtracting market returns from raw returns. 
We report an average of about nine new position openings and the same number of closures each 
day over the twenty-three months, suggesting that large value short selling is relatively active 
during the sample period.  
 [Table 2 about here] 
A unique feature of our data is that we can observe the period between the first crossing of 
the threshold (0.25% of shares outstanding) and the covering trade (a reduction to below the 
threshold). For simplicity, we refer to this period as the duration of the short position. However, 
it is not exactly equal to the holding period of the short position because we do not observe how 
long the short position remains below the threshold. In addition to the short positions, we also 
track price changes and other variables over this period. In Panel B of Table 2, we report the 
summary statistics across the 4,133 reported large short positions. At the position level, the mean 
duration is 38.15 trading days with a median of 13 days. The average covering trade size is 
0.12% of the total shares outstanding, while the average position size is about 0.36%. This means 
that the average covering trade size is economically significant. Thus we expect certain price 
impact.   
                                                          
4
   The average USD/JPY exchange rate was ¥92.05 during our sample period.  
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The average raw return across all short positions is 405.17 bps, and the median is 27.06 bps. 
The positive returns represent losses to short positions between the time traders cross the 
threshold and cover their trade. Because we do not observe the short-sales that take place before 
crossing the threshold, these positive returns do not imply that short selling generates losses 
overall. In particular, a decline in price between a trader’s initial short-sale and the subsequent 
accumulation of the large short position before crossing the threshold implies that the returns in 
Panel B may be different from the actual returns to short sellers. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
In this section, we provide the first comprehensive empirical evidence of short covering trades. 
We start with an event study in which we examine the market impact of covering trades on the 
surrounding days. Next, we examine the duration of large short positions using a Cox 
proportional hazard model and provide new insights about what influences short sellers’ closing 
decisions. We then analyze market reaction to large short covering trades in a panel regression 
framework and address the heterogeneity of these trades. 
4.1. Event study of short covering trades 
To understand short sellers’ covering decisions and the market impact of these trades, we 
examine short windows around the trade dates. Specifically, Day 0 refers to the trade date, and 
we use the windows [-5,-1], [1,2], and [3,7] to test what happens before and after covering 
trades. For most firms, the report date when the position information is revealed to the public 
falls within the [1,2] window. We expect at least part of the price adjustment to take place 
around the trade. We focus our discussion of price effects on the market-adjusted returns, but we 
also report raw returns. 
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[Figure 2 about here]  
[Table 3 about here] 
In Figure 2, Panel A, we plot returns, market-adjusted returns, and market model adjusted 
returns around covering trades. In the week leading to the trade date (day 0), most days have 
positive returns, in contrast to the contrarian trading by short sellers shown in Diether et al. 
(2009). These positive returns also indicate that margin calls as a result of rising prices may 
cause some sellers to close their positions. In Table 3, univariate tests show that the mean Adj. 
Ret [-5,-1] is significantly positive, which also suggests positive returns precede closures. 
However, note that the median Adj. Ret [-5,-1] has a small magnitude (0.002%) and is not 
statistically significant. More important, Figure 2 shows a spike in returns on covering trade date 
and Table 3 confirms that raw returns on Day [0] are positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level. Furthermore, the mean (median) adjusted returns of 0.421% (0.11%) on the trade day, 
Day [0], are economically significant. Overall, there is a robust positive price reaction on the 
days of covering trades, which supports our first hypothesis (H1) that short coverings are 
associated with positive returns. Regarding the periods after covering trades, the medians Adj. 
Ret [1,2] and Adj. Ret [3,7] are negative, while the respective means are positive. These mixed 
results demonstrate that the positive price reaction on the days of covering trades is not fully 
reversed on the report day or afterwards. These findings also suggest heterogeneity in the market 
impact of covering trades across the positions.  
To further examine stock prices post covering trades, we calculate returns for longer 
horizons, specifically for the 1-, 3-, and 6-month horizons after the coverings. The mean adjusted 
returns are positive and significant, but the median adjusted returns are negative for the 1- and 3-
month horizons. For the 6-month horizon, both the mean and median of adjusted returns are 
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positive and significant, though only at the 10% level for the median. Thus, we can rule out 
return reversals and also provide further evidence that, on average, short sellers are informed in 
their covering trades. This finding is consistent with our second hypothesis (H2A) that short 
sellers use private information in closing their positions. Although we find no evidence 
supporting the alternative hypothesis (H2B) that shorts sellers on average are forced to cover 
prematurely, the differences in mean and median returns at the 1- and 3-month horizons suggest 
that market impact varies across covering trades.  
Figure 3 illustrates the unwinding of the positions. In Panel A of Figure 3, we show that on 
average the short positions are gradually reduced, consistent with short sellers trying to reduce 
transaction costs. More important, there is a larger reduction in short position on the day of 
covering trade, indicating the importance of covering trade days. We also note that small trades 
prior to the large covers suggest that many short sellers have already decided to close their 
positions days ahead and therefore are not forced to close. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
In Panel B of Figure 3, we differentiate across the active short sellers in our sample by 
comparing the same 10-day window prior to coverings between brokerage firms and other 
institutions. These large investment firms with brokerage service may be in better positions to 
time trades as they have information from their informed clients and their proprietary trading 
desk. Interestingly, we see similar magnitude and gradual decline in the positions by brokerage 
firms as by other institutions, suggesting no significant difference in covering between non-
brokerage and brokerage firms. 
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4.2. Determinants of short sellers’ holding period 
In addition to understanding returns around covering trades, we desire better understanding of 
short sellers’ trading strategies. We use duration analysis to answer the question: What 
determines when short sellers cover their positions? We assume that the day of the opening 
report is the first day when short sellers are at risk of exit by closing their positions. As noted, we 
cannot measure the actual position buildup that leads to the first (opening) report, so the report 
date is the first date at risk. The exit (closure) date refers to the date on the last report 
representing the covering trade.  
We examine the decision to cover, which is conditional on having reported the opening at 
time 0 and on the existing short position at time t. We have multiple positions and corresponding 
events for most of the stocks, so to estimate the survival of these positions over time we must 
allow for cross correlation within stock observations. Thus, we report the coefficient estimates 
with the standard errors and the corresponding hazard ratios for time variant and time invariant 
variables from a Cox proportional hazard model which allows for the correlation between the 
observations within each stock and for the variation in the log hazard function across stocks. 
Time varying covariates include cumulative reported return of the position (PosCumRet), total 
large shorts by short sellers in our sample (InstSIR), aggregate shorting activity in the market 
(AggSIR), the percentage of total shares available for borrowing (Supply), turnover (Turnover), 
bid-ask spread (BAspread), and market return (Market Return). The time varying covariates are 
calculated on the previous day and change daily for each short position. The time invariant 
covariates (market capitalization, market-to-book, insider ownership, and institutional 
ownership) remain unchanged for each position and are calculated on the day the large position 
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is first reported. However, these time invariant variables change across positions for the same 
stock.
5
 
 [Table 4 about here] 
We begin by examining the effect the return of the short position has on the probability of 
exiting, from the opening to the covering date. The estimated coefficient on the position return 
variable (PosCumRet-1) is -0.1377 and significant at the 10% level (see Model 1 in Table 4). The 
hazard ratio of 0.87 implies that a 1% increase in the cumulative position return reduces the exit 
probability by 13% (1.00-0.87). An increasing position return implies an increasing loss to short 
sellers, therefore, the probability of observing a covering decision declines with greater position 
losses. Examining the time invariant firm characteristics, we note that exit probability is higher, 
ceteris paribus, for firms that are larger, have higher market-to-book, greater institutional 
ownership, and lower insider ownership.  
The above findings are robust to adding other time varying covariates in Models 2-4. 
Interestingly, the estimated coefficients of the short-sale related time-varying covariates suggest 
that covering is more likely when either the aggregate disclosed large shorts (InstSIR) reduces or 
the total short supply (Supply) lessens. In other words, short sellers tend to cover their positions 
when reported short selling activities are reduced in the same stock. On the impacts of stock 
related time-varying covariates, short positions tend to be closed when turnover (Turnover) 
increases or the bid-ask spread (BAspread) decreases, indicating that the stock’s trading also 
affects the covering decision. We also find that overall market condition impacts short sellers 
since covering is more likely when market return (Market Return) is higher. 
                                                          
5 For robustness checks, we reran the analysis excluding stocks with 5 or fewer observations and found results 
similar to those reported in Table 4. 
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In summary, our findings suggest that covering is more likely when the short position is more 
profitable, which could be interpreted as a “disposition” effect where short sellers prefer to cover 
positions that allow them to book trading profits. Also, covering is more likely when the market 
is liquid, consistent with the earlier observation that the covering decision is associated with 
substantial transient price impacts, thus high transaction costs. To mitigate the price impact, 
traders may strategically time their trade executions during more liquid periods.   
Another, perhaps more plausible, interpretation is that short sellers are informed traders who 
take a position in overvalued firms, wait until prices have adjusted to their fundamental values, 
and then cover their position (Boehmer and Wu, 2013). In this case, a negative position return 
that generates profit for short sellers would imply that the efficient price adjustment is still in 
progress or is complete. In contrast, a positive position return, which implies a trading loss, 
indicates that short sellers’ information is not yet fully reflected in prices, so short sellers should 
delay covering. This version is more consistent with extant findings that informed short sellers 
trade to improve the informational efficiency of prices. 
 
4.3. Aggregate market reaction and information in coverings  
Following Diether et al. (2009), we use regressions to test the information content in short 
coverings by examining stock returns around covering trades. The dependent variables are 
adjusted daily returns. The key variables of interest are the four dummy variables (i.e., D1-5,-1, 
D20, D31,2 and D43,7), each representing one of the windows [-5,1], [0], [1,2], and [3,7], where 
day 0 is the covering trade date for each short position. In Models 1-5, the covering trade is the 
trade that reduces the large short position to below the reporting requirement, while in Model 6 
we focus on trades that reduce the short positions by at least 0.05% of the shares outstanding. We 
add a comprehensive set of controls, including the average daily turnover during the previous 
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week, the average bid-ask spread during the previous week, the natural logarithm of the market 
capitalization, market-to-book ratio, institutional ownership percentage, and insider ownership 
percentage. We also include firm and day fixed effects to incorporate unobservable heterogeneity 
across firms and time as well as cluster standard errors at the firm level.
6
 
The positive coefficients on the D1-5,-1 variable in Models 1 through 5 show that the stock 
returns are significantly positive before the cover trades. This finding is consistent with our 
univariate results (Table 3) that short sellers are not contrarian when covering their positions. 
Such positive price pressure before covering trades also suggests that adverse price pressure may 
force certain short sellers to cover their positions. In later analysis (Table 7), we differentiate 
across short sellers to disentangle the informed, unconstrained short sellers from the less-
informed, constrained short sellers. 
 [Table 5 about here] 
For covering trade dates, Table 5 shows results consistent with our univariate findings that 
returns are significantly positive, as implied by the positive significant coefficient of 0.3223 
(D20) in Model 1. We also find evidence of reversals for about one third to one fourth of the 
magnitude in the week after the date of the covering trade report, implied by the negative and 
statistically significant estimated coefficient D43,7. However, the net effect is still positive when 
we combine the coefficient estimates D20, D31,2, and D43,7 (the p-value is 0.0012 for the F-test 
that the sum D20+D31,2+D43,7 is different from zero.) Overall, we find strong support for our first 
hypothesis (H1) that positive returns are linked to short covering trades.  
In Model 2, we consider the economic significance of covering trades and test Easley and 
O’Hara’s (1987) prediction that larger trades have more information as market makers infer 
information from the trade size and potentially make trades more costly. To test this prediction, 
                                                          
6
 Results are similar when standard errors are clustered at both the firm and day levels. 
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we use the Cover Size variable which is the percentage of the total shares covered in a buy trade 
which reduces the size of the short position below the reporting threshold. Thus, this variable 
takes on the value of the covering trade size on day D20 and zero on all other days.  Indeed, we 
find that larger cover trades are associated with greater positive returns: a large covering trade of 
0.10% of total shares outstanding will result in an increase of 13.06 bps in adjusted return on the 
covering trade day. This finding is also consistent with Figure 2 Panel B, which shows that high 
returns are concentrated among larger covering trades.  
In Model 3, we examine short covering dynamics with the AllCoverSize variable which takes 
on the value of the short covering trades on days when the size of the reported large short 
positions reduces and zero on other days. We also include an interaction term between 
AllCoverSize and D0. The results from Model 3 are consistent with those from Model 2, 
indicating that on average covering trades have a positive price impact. And the positive 
significant coefficient estimate on the interaction term AllCoverSize*D0 suggests that the positive 
returns associated with covering trades are significantly larger when the short position is reduced 
to below the threshold. Specifically, considering a trade of 0.10% of the shares outstanding, the 
covering days experience an additional 7.7 bps return impact.  
In Models 4 and 5, we interact variables related to short selling activities (Supply-1 and 
AggSIR-1) to D20 to further analyze covering-induced returns. We find that while supply impacts 
the returns on the covering trade date, the aggregate shorting demand does not. Specifically, the 
negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate on Supply-1*D20 shows that covering-
induced returns are larger when the relative supply is lower, suggesting that the impact of the 
covering trade is larger when the stock lending market has tighter supply. The finding is related 
22 
 
to prior literature showing that pricing efficiency is negatively correlated with supply (Saffi and 
Sigurdsson, 2011).  
More important, the coefficients on the D20 dummy still remain positive and significant in 
both models, and this finding is robust when we include other control variables related to stock 
specific characteristics. To complement our results on covering trades, we examine returns 
before and after large decreases in reported short positions (see Model 6). In particular, we 
identify days when institutions in our sample reduce the size of their short positions by more than 
0.05% of the total shares outstanding. Thus, we also capture days that institutions partially cover 
their short positions. Model 6 of Table 5 shows that, similar to covering dates, returns on days of 
large purchases are significantly positive and only partially reverse afterwards. 
In Table 6, we perform robustness tests of the market impact of short coverings by using 1) 
an alternative return specification, 2) an alternative regression method (Fama-MacBeth instead of 
a panel regression), and 3) a sample that does not filter out the less active institutional short 
sellers. 
[Table 6 about here] 
In Table 6, Models 1 and 2, we replicate the main analyses from Table 5 with market model 
adjusted returns. Specifically, for each month, we use daily returns in the previous six months to 
estimate beta for each stock, and then calculate market model adjusted return as the difference 
between stock return and the product of its beta and market return. The coefficient estimates D0 
in Models 1 and 2 are economically and statistically similar to those reported in Table 5 (Models 
3 and 5) with the market excess returns. In Models 3 and 4, using Fama-MacBeth regressions 
rather than panel regressions, we also find that our results are economically and statistically 
similar for returns around covering trades.  
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Last, we check the robustness of our results by using an extended sample that includes all 
reported large short positions (i.e., reported not only by active traders but by all short sellers). 
The extended sample has 4,832 positions (versus 4,133 positions by active institutions in the 
sample used in the main analysis) by 176 institutions. As Models 5 and 6 in Table 6 show, the 
results are again similar to those reported in Table 5 (Models 3 and 5) with the active 
institutional sample. 
 
4.4. Heterogeneity in short coverings, the role of information and short-sale constraints 
While Tables 5 and 6 show how covering trades impact short-term stock returns, in this section 
we test hypotheses H2A and H2B by examining the long-term return performance following the 
covering trades. If short sellers are skilled informed traders who can time the covering trades, we 
should not observe large stock price declines after closing. However, if short sellers initially 
expected to be positioned in overvalued stocks based on prior evidence but are forced to close 
out their position prematurely because of internal capital constraints or other external short-sale 
constraints, then the stock price would continue to decline after the initial positive price impact, 
suggesting some inefficiency in closing (i.e., money left on the table by short sellers).  
 [Table 7 about here] 
In Table 7, we examine the 1-, 3-, and 6-month post covering trade returns by using a 
regression framework that considers informational heterogeneity among short sellers and the 
presence of short-sale constraints. First, in Models A-1 through A-3, we differentiate short 
positions using the aggregate shorting ratio, AggSIR. The negative significant coefficient of -
0.2969 on AggSIR in Model A-1 suggest that the stocks experience significant positive return 
after the covering when the aggregate SIR is low. This means that the market interprets the 
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covering signal from individual large short sellers in conjunction with the total outstanding short 
positions of the group of short sellers. Thus, when the withdrawal of short sellers as a group 
includes our reported short covering, the market considers the disappearance of negative opinion 
as a strong positive signal. However, when a specific short covering is in a stock that still 
contains large short positions uncovered by other traders, the market’s positive response is 
mitigated. 
Next, we separate short sellers using reported return, PosCumRet, which is the cumulative 
return on the stock since the opening of the reported large short position until the covering day. 
In Models B-2 and B-3, we observe negative coefficients for PosCumRet, indicating that returns 
post covering trades are higher for more profitable shorts, which are more likely executed by 
more informed short sellers. Specifically, we can infer from Model B-3 that stocks in which 
large profitable short positions (e.g., with 5% profits) were closed on average earn 0.65% higher 
returns over the next month than similar stocks where short sellers position just broke even. 
Taken together with results in Models A-1 to A-3, these findings support hypothesis H2A and 
indicate that the more informed short sellers are more efficient in covering their positions. 
To test H2B, we examine the role of short-sale constraints using internal capital constraints 
and securities lending market measures. Since PosCumRet captures short sellers’ returns, it also 
indicates whether large losses or capital constraints cause short sellers to close their trades 
prematurely. (See Lamont and Stein, 2004, for a detailed discussion about short sellers’ capital 
constraints during the IT bubble.) The negative coefficients on PosCumRet in Models B-2 and B-
3 suggest that losses due to price appreciation may force some short sellers to face margin calls 
and close their positions while the price correction is still in progress. In Models C-1 through C-
3, we analyze the impact of short-sale constraints captured by lending fees (Lendingfee) since 
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increases in lending fees make short positions more costly. With these two measures, we want to 
examine whether short-sale constraints play a role and cause premature covering. However, the 
mixed results on our constraint measures (PosCumRet and Lendingfee) imply that while short-
sale constraints impact certain short sellers, at least for our sample, premature coverings are not 
prevalent. Thus, we do not find strong support for hypothesis H2B.  
Last, in Models D-1 to D-3 of Table 7, we differentiate across institutions based on 
institutional types. Specifically, we consider the role of brokerages and test whether these 
institutions, on average, are more informed than other short sellers and close out trades prior to 
large return run-up. We identify short sellers who are brokerage firms and assign a value of one 
for covering trades by those institutions, and zero for all other trades. The significant positive 
coefficient estimates Brokerage in Table 7 Models D-1 and D-2 imply positive future returns are 
higher after covering by brokerage firms. This finding suggests that either highly informed short 
sellers use brokerages to conceal their identities or that the brokerage’s proprietary trading desks, 
with better access to timely market information and internal research, place more efficiently 
timed covering trades. Data limitations prevent us from disentangling client-initiated and internal 
trades. Therefore we cannot provide strong insight about the source of information.   
Overall, the results from Tables 5-7 suggest that positive transient and permanent returns 
associated with short coverings provide important new information to the market. Our findings 
add valuable contributions to prior studies that focused exclusively on the opening of the shorts, 
and therefore provided only partial views regarding the superior information of short sellers.  
5. Conclusion 
Short selling requires two types of transactions: the actual short-sale, and the purchase of stock to 
cover the short-sale. Although numerous studies analyze the former, we have little evidence of 
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effects that short covering transactions have on security prices. We provide a detailed analysis of 
covering trades and their impact on prices by using a dataset of large short positions in excess of 
0.25% of the shares outstanding, which TSE rules have required to be disclosed since November 
11, 2008. 
Although earlier work shows short sellers are contrarians when opening their positions, we 
find that short sellers, on average, are not contrarian traders when covering their positions. 
Moreover, we report a significant positive price impact around large covering trades, reflecting 
both transient and permanent components. We also document that short sellers who are 
profitable during their disclosure period also have their cover trades followed by future positive 
returns. Despite some indications that short sellers are forced to cover due to price appreciation, 
short-sale constraints in our sample do not play an important role. Thus, our findings provide 
strong evidence that informed short sellers use private information when closing their positions. 
Overall, we offer new insights into short-sale dynamics, including the covering of large short 
positions. To our knowledge, we are the first to focus on short covering trades, and our analysis 
of the effects of these trades complements a large body of literature that shows that short sellers 
help incorporate negative information into prices. We show that short sellers also help to 
incorporate positive information into prices, and this positive price impact appears to be 
economically large.  
Our analysis is relevant for regulators and market participants by helping them to better 
understand short sellers’ behavior. Consistent with extant short-sale studies, we show that short 
sellers, as a group, are informed. Although other studies show that short sellers have timing 
ability when they open short positions, we go beyond the current literature to show that short 
sellers can also predict, or may cause, price increases around their covering decision.  
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Panel A. Time series of the aggregate short selling and total value of short positions based on disclosed reports by 
active institutions  
 
 
Panel B. Tokyo Stock Price Index and cumulative returns 
 
 
Figure 1.  
Time series of shorted value and Tokyo Stock Price Index performance from November 2008 to September 
2010 
Panel A shows the time series of the total value of short positions reported by active institutions to the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, and the aggregate shorted value in billion yen, proxied by the total shares out on loan from Markit 
Securities. Panel B shows the Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX) level and the cumulative returns on TOPIX from 
November 2008 to September 2010.  
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Panel A. Average daily returns around the covering trades (covering is day 0) for all short positions. Adj Return is 
the daily return in excess of market return and Market Model Return is the adjusted return using market model 
 
Panel B. Average daily adjusted returns around the covering trades (covering is day 0) for terciles based on the size 
of covering trades, which is the number of traded shares over the number of shares outstanding 
 
 
Figure 2. Returns around the covering trades 
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Panel A. Overview of the short position decline before the covering trade (covering is day 0) based on full sample 
 
Panel B. Overview of the short position decline before the covering trade (covering is day 0) for brokerages vs. 
others
 
 
Figure 3. Position size before the covering trades  
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Table 1.  
Descriptive Statistics of TSE listed stocks from November 2008 to September 2010 
Panel A summarizes financial information obtained at the end of the fiscal year. Panel B summarizes stock return 
characteristics at the daily level. In Panel A: MarketCap is the number of shares outstanding times the daily stocks 
price in million yen. Market-to-book is the market capitalization relative to the book value of common equity at the 
end of the fiscal year. IO (%) and Insider (%) are the percentage of the total shares held by institutional investors 
and insiders, respectively. In Panel B: Close Price is the daily close price in yen. Turnover (%) is the daily traded 
shares relative to the total number of shares outstanding in percentage. BAspread is the daily average bid and ask 
price difference, scaled by the average of the daily bid and ask prices. Ret (bps) and AdjRet (bps) are the daily raw 
return and return in excess of the market return. MMAdjRet (bps) is the abnormal return from the market model, with 
betas estimated using the previous rolling 6-month daily returns. InstSIR (%) is the total number of shorted shares 
from the disclosures relative to the total number of shares outstanding. Supply (%) is the total number of shares 
available for lending relative to the total shares outstanding. AggSIR (%) is the total number of borrowed shares as a 
percentage of the total shares outstanding. Lendingfee (bps) is the annualized fee to borrow the specific stock 
reported in bps. When comparing the means and medians between stocks with short reports and stocks without short 
reports, significance levels at 1, 5, and 10% are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
Panel A. Comparison of annual financial information of stocks with and without large short-sale reports 
 
Stocks with large short 
reports  (889 stocks)   
Stocks without large short 
reports (650 stocks) 
Mean 
difference 
Median 
difference 
 
Mean  Median 
 
Mean  Median   
MarketCap 177,712 52,077 
 
181,014 21,367 0.11 -10.12 
Market-to-Book 1.1508 0.9270 
 
0.908 0.708 -3.57*** -10.22*** 
IO (%) 13.1758 11.5584 
 
7.157 4.986 -15.03*** -14.14*** 
Insider (%) 37.5422 36.1879 
 
43.659 43.014 7.57*** 7.19*** 
 
Panel B. Comparison of daily stock trade characteristics of stocks with and without large short-sale reports 
 
Stocks with short reports 
(N=889) 
Stocks without short reports 
(N=650) 
Mean 
difference 
Median 
difference 
 
Mean  Median Mean  Median 
 
 
Close Price 8176 682 5152 510 -1.53 -3.50*** 
Turnover (%) 0.5725 0.3938 0.2021 0.1317 -14.31*** -19.64*** 
BAspread (%) 0.5562 0.4009 0.8090 0.6188 8.53*** 10.79*** 
Ret (bps) 5.3800 4.6483 2.8311 2.3080 -6.18*** -5.91*** 
AdjRet (bps) 5.7830 5.0513 3.2341 2.7111 -6.18*** -5.91*** 
MMAdjRet (bps) 5.8047 4.9559 3.3894 2.6268 -5.89*** -5.62*** 
InstSIR (%) 0.1870 0.1004 0.0000 0.0000 -22.08*** -34.89*** 
AggSIR (%) 1.0214 0.7364 0.2333 0.1421 -20.98*** -25.07*** 
Supply (%) 4.0514 3.2460 2.9268 2.2224 -7.51*** -8.17*** 
Lendingfee (bps) 91.9777 45.4343 67.8938 43.5076 -5.49*** -1.56 
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Table 2. 
Descriptive statistics of reported large short positions by active institutions from the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
from November 2008 to September 2010 
In Panel A, PositionValue is the average number of shorted shares reported times the daily share price for the 
outstanding reported large short positions (when the total number of shorted shares exceeds 0.25% of the total shares 
outstanding by any trader) in million yen. Ret (bps) and AdjRet (bps) are the daily raw return and return in excess of 
the market return of all stocks that at some point during the sample period have large short positions reported by 
active institutions. Number of shorted stocks daily is the number of stocks with outstanding large short positions on 
average per day in the sample. Number of daily openings and Number of daily coverings are the number of large 
short position openings and number of covering trades on average per day. Under the By stocks heading, Ret (bps) is 
the daily raw return and AjdRet (bps) is the daily return in excess of the market return for stocks during the days in 
which disclosed large positions are reported.  
In Panel B, the PositionValue is the average by position of number of shorted shares times the corresponding day 
close share price in million yen. Duration is the average number of days the short position is reported to the public 
above the threshold. Ret (bps) is the average return of all short positions, where the returns are based on days that 
short positions are reported. Value-weighted Ret (bps) is the average returns across all positions weighted by the 
values of short positions.  
Panel A. Aggregate and by stock summary statistics 
  N Mean Std Dev Median 
Aggregate 
 
   
PositionValue (million yen) 157685 632.52 1559.41 245.61 
Ret (bps) 119819 9.02 313.83 0.00 
AdjRet (bps) 119819 5.94 278.26 -9.51 
Number of shorted stocks daily  462 259.35 108.43 260 
Number of daily openings 458 9.02 8.60 7.50 
Number of daily coverings 459 9.00 5.60 8.00 
By Stocks 
    Ret (bps) 889 8.20 55.29 7.25 
AdjRet (bps) 889 7.10 49.76 5.66 
 
Panel B. By Position summary statistics 
4133 unique positions  Mean Std Dev Median 
PositionValue (%) 0.3603 0.2621 0.2845 
PositionValue (million yen)  566.03 1131.84 225.51 
Duration (day) 38.15 56.55 13 
Ret (bps) 405.17 2390.28 27.06 
Cover Size (%) 0.1168 0.2312 0.0500 
Value-weighted Ret (bps) 278.22 
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Table 3.  
Descriptive summary of stock returns around covering of large short positions 
The table displays the cumulative raw returns before and after the covering trades for the 4133 unique positions. 
Under the heading of Short term returns (%), Ret[-5,-1] is the cumulative returns for the five days prior to cover and 
Ret[0] is the daily raw return on the actual cover date. Ret[1,2] and Ret[3,7] are the cumulative returns for the first 
two days after the cover and the subsequent 5 days. For each window, Adj.Ret is the adjusted return, which is the 
difference between returns and market returns. Under the heading of Long term returns (%) is the 1-month, 3-month 
and 6-month returns after the covering trades. Significance levels of the mean and median values at 1, 5, and 10% 
are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 
 
  Mean p-value   Median p-value 
Short term returns (%)      
Ret [-5,-1]  0.873*** <.001 
 
0.156** 0.048 
Adj.Ret [-5,-1]  0.753*** <.001 
 
0.002 1.000 
Ret [0]  0.510*** <.001 
 
0.223*** <.001 
Adj.Ret [0]  0.421*** <.001 
 
0.111*** 0.006 
Ret [1,2]  0.120 0.125 
 
0.000 0.543 
Adj.Ret [1,2]  0.143** 0.041 
 
-0.097* 0.099 
Ret [3,7]  0.204* 0.089 
 
-0.272* 0.076 
Adj.Ret [3,7]  0.036 0.729 
 
-0.328*** <.001 
      
Long term returns (%)      
1-month Ret  1.893*** <.001  0.240 0.181 
1-month Adj.Ret  1.031*** <.001  -0.130 0.419 
3-month Ret  5.674*** <.001  1.515*** <.001 
3-month Adj.Ret  2.936*** <.001  -0.103 0.803 
6-month Ret  9.378*** <.001  3.121*** <.001 
6-month Adj.Ret 4.648*** <.001  0.558* 0.099 
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Table 4. 
Cox proportional hazards model for the duration of large reported short positions 
For each short position, conditional on having reached the threshold (0.25% of the number of shares outstanding), 
we estimate the hazard rate of exiting the large short position. The time-varying covariates: PosCumRet-1 (in 
decimal) is the raw cumulative return on the stock on the previous trading day since the opening of the position. 
InstSIR-1 is the shorted shares from disclosed institutional reports relative to the shares outstanding one day before. 
AggSIR-1 is the total number of shorted shares (from all positions) relative to shares outstanding one day before. 
Supply-1 is the shares available for shorting relative to total shares outstanding on the previous day, Turnover-5,-1 and 
BASpread-5,-1 are the average daily turnover and the average bid-ask spread during the previous five days, and 
Market Return-1 is the return using the Tokyo Stock Price Index on the previous day. The time invariant variables do 
not change for the duration of a specific position and are: Ln(MarketCap) is the natural logarithm of the number of 
shares outstanding in millions times the daily shares price in yen. Market-to-book is the market capitalization 
relative to the book value of common equity. IO and Insiders are the number of shares held by institutions and by 
insiders, respectively, relative to the total shares outstanding in percentage. We report coefficients and hazard ratios 
from the Cox model with the associated standard errors (in brackets) adjusted for clustering by stocks and allowing 
for the variation in the log hazard function across stocks. The estimation uses 4,133 positions with an average 
duration of 38 days. Significance levels at 1, 5, and 10% are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
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Table 4. (Continued) 
Cox proportional hazards model for the duration of large reported short positions 
 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
  
  
Coefficient 
/ [SE] 
Hazard 
ratio 
  
Coefficient 
/ [SE] 
Hazard 
ratio 
  
Coefficient 
/ [SE] 
Hazard 
ratio 
  
Coefficient 
/ [SE] 
Hazard 
ratio 
Time Varying Covariates  
PosCumRet-1  
-0.1814* 0.8341 
 
-0.2551** 0.7749 
 
-0.2263** 0.7975 
 
-0.2083* 0.8120 
 
 
[0.1053] 0.8341 
 
[0.1090] 0.7749 
 
[0.1097] 0.7975 
 
[0.1081] 0.8120 
InstSIR-1     
-0.0964*** 0.9081 
      
 
    
[0.0340] 0.9081 
      
AggSIR-1        
-0.0054 0.9946 
   
 
       
[0.0135] 0.9946 
   
Supply-1           
-0.0192*** 0.9810 
 
          
[0.0067] 0.9810 
Turnover-5,-1     
0.0263*** 1.0266 
 
0.0254*** 1.0257 
 
0.0242*** 1.0245 
 
    
[0.0087] 1.0266 
 
[0.0080] 1.0257 
 
[0.0078] 1.0245 
BAspread-5,-1     
0.0021 1.0021 
 
0.0042 1.0042 
 
0.0027 1.0027 
 
    
[0.0426] 1.0021 
 
[0.0421] 1.0042 
 
[0.0420] 1.0027 
Market Return-1  0.0164*** 1.0166  0.0169*** 1.0171  0.0167*** 1.0168  0.0165*** 1.0166 
  [0.0049] 1.0166  [0.0049] 1.0171  [0.0049] 1.0168  [0.0049] 1.0166 
Time Invariant Covariates 
Ln(MarketCap) 
 
-0.0302 0.9703 
 
-0.0442 0.9568 
 
-0.0424 0.9585 
 
-0.0162 0.9840 
 
 
[0.2023] 0.9703 
 
[0.1990] 0.9568 
 
[0.2013] 0.9585 
 
[0.2030] 0.9840 
Market-to-book 
 
0.2745*** 1.3158 
 
0.2567*** 1.2927 
 
0.2749*** 1.3164 
 
0.2657*** 1.3043 
 
 
[0.0753] 1.3158 
 
[0.0733] 1.2927 
 
[0.0750] 1.3164 
 
[0.0749] 1.3043 
IO 
 
-0.0057 0.9944 
 
-0.0002 0.9998 
 
-0.0034 0.9966 
 
-0.0043 0.9957 
 
 
[0.0140] 0.9944 
 
[0.0142] 0.9998 
 
[0.0141] 0.9966 
 
[0.0143] 0.9957 
Insiders 
 
-0.0258 0.9745 
 
-0.0261 0.9742 
 
-0.0277 0.9727 
 
-0.0294 0.9710 
    [0.0289] 0.9745 
 
[0.0284] 0.9742 
 
[0.0288] 0.9727 
 
[0.0292] 0.9710 
Likelihood Ratio 
 
80.12 
  
181.67 
  
126.97 
  
148.71 
 
Score 
 
83.61 
  
183.99 
  
139.13 
  
163.76 
 
Wald 
 
80.61 
  
175.78 
  
131.15 
  
156.75 
 
Number of Obs     153552       153552       153552       153552   
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Table 5.  
Panel regression for the market reaction to cover of large short positions 
The dependent variable is the daily adjusted returns (AdjRet), which is the daily returns in excess of TOPIX, the 
value weighted stock index return for TSE. In Models 1 to 5, dummy variables D1-5,-1, D20, D31,2, and D43,7 capture 
the days around the cover date and the cover date. D20 has a value of 1 on the covering trade date and 0 otherwise. 
D1-5,-1 takes on the value of 1 for the 5 days before the cover trade and 0 otherwise. D31,2 takes on the value of 1 for 
the two days following the cover and D43,7 takes on the value of  1 for the subsequent five days and 0 otherwise. In 
Model 6, D1-5,-1, D20, D31,2, and D43,7 capture the days around purchases of 0.05% or more of the total shares 
outstanding. Cover Size is the size of the covering trade as the percentage of the total shares outstanding, which 
variable takes on the value only on covering trade day, otherwise zero. AllCoverSize takes on the size of the 
covering trade (in percentage of total shares outstanding) on days the short position value declines, and 0 on other 
days. AllCoverSize*D20 is the interaction term between AllCoverSize and D20 variables. Supply-1 is the shares 
available for shorting relative to total shares outstanding on the previous day and Supply-1* D20 is the interaction 
term between D20 and Supply-1. AggSIR-1, which is the total number of shorted shares relative to shares outstanding 
on the previous day and AggSIR-1*D20 is the interaction term between D20 and AggSIR-1. For brevity the firm 
controls, Ln(MarketCap), Turnover-5,-1, BAspread-5,-1, Market-to-book, IO and Insiders, are defined in Table 4. The 
regression results are reported from panel regression with firm and day fixed effects and clustering of the standard 
errors at the firm level (intercepts are not reported). Significance levels at 1, 5, and 10% are denoted by ***, **, and 
*, respectively.  
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Table 5. (Continued) 
Panel regression for the market reaction to cover of large short positions 
 Covering Trades Large Buys 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
D1-5,-1 0.0646** 0.0639** 0.0668*** 0.0726*** 0.0744*** 0.0644*** 
  [0.0251] [0.0251] [0.0252] [0.0252] [0.0253] [0.0212] 
D20 0.3223*** 0.1680*** 0.1824*** 0.5084*** 0.3619*** 0.4539*** 
  [0.0594] [0.0578] [0.0579] [0.0902] [0.0763] [0.0645] 
D31,2 -0.0147 -0.0149 -0.0516 -0.0058 -0.0035 -0.0510** 
  [0.0344] [0.0343] [0.0360] [0.0347] [0.0345] [0.0256] 
D43,7 -0.0853*** -0.0844*** -0.0748*** -0.0759*** -0.0742*** -0.0418** 
 
[0.0204] [0.0203] [0.0207] [0.0207] [0.0207] [0.0179] 
Cover Size 
 
1.3064***  
   
  
[0.2840]  
   
AllCoverSize   0.5436***    
   [0.1433]    
AllCoverSize * D20   0.7740***    
   [0.2922]    
Supply-1 * D20   
 -0.0425*** 
 
-0.0209* 
   
 [0.0133] 
 
[0.0114] 
Supply-1    -0.0121***  -0.0118*** 
    [0.0032]  [0.0032] 
AggSIR-1 * D20   
 
 
-0.0215 
 
   
 
 
[0.0328] 
 
AggSIR-1     -0.0077  
     [0.0090]  
Ln(MarketCap) 
  
-0.4280*** -0.4208*** -0.4268*** -0.4213*** 
   
[0.0322] [0.0321] [0.0321] [0.0321] 
Turnover-5,-1   
-0.0138** -0.0142** -0.0131** -0.0153** 
   
[0.0064] [0.0064] [0.0064] [0.0064] 
BAspread-5,-1   
0.0651*** 0.0651*** 0.0647*** 0.0659*** 
   
[0.0179] [0.0179] [0.0179] [0.0180] 
Market-to-book 
  
0.0543*** 0.0521** 0.0534*** 0.0514** 
   
[0.0204] [0.0207] [0.0204] [0.0208] 
IO 
  
-0.0071*** -0.0070*** -0.0069*** -0.0071*** 
   
[0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0019] 
Insiders 
  
-0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0017 
   
[0.0024] [0.0024] [0.0024] [0.0024] 
Adj. R-sq 0.0321 0.0322 0.0335 0.0333 0.0332 0.0336 
Observations 410718 410718 410718 410718 410718 410718 
P-val: 
D2+D3+D4=0 
0.0012 0.3063 0.4039 <0.0001 0.0010 <0.0001 
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Table 6.  
Robust regressions for the market reaction to cover of large short positons 
The dependent variables are the daily market model adjusted return in Models 1 and 2, and adjusted return in 
Models 3 through 6 as defined in Table 5. Dummy variables D1-5,-1, D20, D31,2, and D43,7 capture the days around the 
cover date, where the day of the cover trade is D20. D1-5,-1 is the 5-days before the cover trade, and D31,2 captures the 
two days following the cover trade and D43,7 captures the subsequent five days. Supply-1 is the shares available for 
shorting relative to total shares outstanding on the previous day. For brevity the firm controls, Ln(MarketCap), 
Turnover-5,-1, BAspread-5,-1, Market-to-book, IO and Insiders, are defined in Table 4. For Models 1-2 and 5-6, the 
regression results are reported from panel regressions with firm and day fixed effects and clustering of the standard 
errors at the firm level (intercepts are not reported). For Models 3-4, results are from Fama-MacBeth regressions 
with standard errors adjusted using the Newey and West estimator with 3 lags. Significance levels at 1, 5, and 10% 
are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 
Market Model 
Adjusted Returns  
Adjusted Returns  
Fama-MacBeth  
Adjusted Returns  
All Short Sellers 
  Cover Large Buy   Cover Large Buy   Cover Large Buy 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
D1-5,-1 0.0734*** 0.0650*** 
 
0.0670** 0.0481** 
 
0.1083*** 0.0987*** 
  [0.0246] [0.0208] 
 
[0.0291] [0.0229] 
 
[0.0251] [0.0206] 
D20 0.3016*** 0.3593*** 
 
0.2727*** 0.2514*** 
 
0.3324*** 0.3761*** 
  [0.0586] [0.0482] 
 
[0.0731] [0.0448] 
 
[0.0544] [0.0442] 
D31,2 -0.0023 -0.0517** 
 
0.0037 -0.0416 
 
0.0092 -0.0564** 
  [0.0336] [0.0252] 
 
[0.0348] [0.0293] 
 
[0.0322] [0.0252] 
D43,7 -0.0806*** -0.0463*** 
 
-0.0711*** -0.0564*** 
 
-0.0670*** -0.0391** 
 
[0.0203] [0.0173] 
 
[0.0257] [0.0207] 
 
[0.0206] [0.0174] 
Supply-1 -0.0117*** -0.0115*** 
 
-0.0004 0.0000 
 
-0.0131*** -0.0128*** 
 
[0.0031] [0.0031] 
 
[0.0021] [0.0021] 
 
[0.0032] [0.0032] 
Ln(MarketCap) -0.4012*** -0.4016*** 
 
-0.0154 -0.0161 
 
-0.3745*** -0.3756*** 
 
[0.0323] [0.0323] 
 
[0.0103] [0.0102] 
 
[0.0263] [0.0263] 
Turnover-5,-1 -0.0120* -0.0132** 
 
0.0133 0.0122 
 
-0.0174*** -0.0185*** 
 
[0.0064] [0.0064] 
 
[0.0157] [0.0155] 
 
[0.0061] [0.0061] 
BAspread-5,-1 0.0597*** 0.0606*** 
 
0.0236 0.0242 
 
0.0700*** 0.0711*** 
 
[0.0170] [0.0171] 
 
[0.0216] [0.0217] 
 
[0.0179] [0.0180] 
Market-to-book 0.0522** 0.0514** 
 
-0.0042 -0.0031 
 
-0.0033*** -0.0034*** 
 
[0.0203] [0.0205] 
 
[0.0093] [0.0093] 
 
[0.0013] [0.0013] 
IO -0.0071*** -0.0072*** 
 
0.0007 0.0007 
 
-0.0071*** -0.0072*** 
 
[0.0019] [0.0019] 
 
[0.0008] [0.0007] 
 
[0.0019] [0.0018] 
Insiders -0.0017 -0.0017 
 
-0.0001 0. 0000 
 
-0.0009 -0.001 
 
[0.0023] [0.0023]   [0.0005] [0.0005]   [0.0021] [0.0022] 
Adj. R-sq 0.0311 0.0313 
 
0.0453 0.0455 
 
0.0334 0.0337 
Observations 410718 410718   410718 410718   425040 425040 
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Table 7.  
Cross sectional return regression for the cover trades  
The dependent variables are the 1, 3, and 6-months post covering trades cumulative adjusted returns, which are returns in excess of the TOPIX market index 
during the corresponding period. AggSIR is the total number of shorted shares relative to shares outstanding on the cover day. PosCumRet is the raw cumulative 
return on the stock since the opening of the reported large short position until the cover day. Lendingfee is the annualized lending fee, the cost for borrowing the 
stock in the lending market at time of the covering. Brokerage dummy variable takes on the value of 1 if the short position is reported by a brokerage firm and 0 
otherwise. For brevity the firm controls, Ln(MarketCap), Turnover-5,-1, BAspread-5,-1, Market-to-book, IO and Insiders are defined in Table 4. The coefficient 
estimates with the corresponding standard errors in brackets are obtained from panel regression with firm and day fixed effects with clustered errors at the firm 
level. The statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 1 month 3 month 6 month 1 month 3 month 6 month 1 month 3 month 6 month 1 month 3 month 6 month 
 ModelA-1 ModelA-2 ModelA-3 ModelB-1 ModelB-2 ModelB-3 ModelC-1 ModelC-2 ModelC-3 ModelD-1 ModelD-2 ModelD-3 
AggSIR -0.2969** -0.7048* -0.8309 
   
      
 
[0.1512] [0.4085] [0.6548] 
   
      
PosCumRet 
   
0.0023 -0.0441* -0.1309***       
    
[0.0124] [0.0246] [0.0381]       
Lendingfee       -0.0023 -0.0019 0.0005    
       [0.0019] [0.0039] [0.0063]    
Brokerage          1.1339** 1.9365* 1.8634 
          [0.5236] [1.1571] [1.4620] 
Ln(MarketCap) 0.2855 -0.0006 0.0433 0.2041 -0.2744 -0.4081 0.1522 -0.244 -0.184 0.1707 -0.2533 -0.2437 
 
[0.2905] [0.7036] [1.0540] [0.2822] [0.6743] [1.0433] [0.2984] [0.6876] [1.0262] [0.2879] [0.6869] [1.0210] 
Turnover-5,-1 -0.0869 -0.1845 -0.4435** -0.0887 -0.1803 -0.4249** -0.0921 -0.1911 -0.4467** -0.1068 -0.2194 -0.4779** 
 
[0.1230] [0.2039] [0.2114] [0.1233] [0.2027] [0.2098] [0.1223] [0.2023] [0.2115] [0.1251] [0.2023] [0.2148] 
BAspread-5,-1 3.0217** 5.9604*** 11.3253*** 3.0299** 5.9013** 11.1304*** 3.0412** 5.9841*** 11.3349*** 3.0391** 5.9932*** 11.3592*** 
 
[1.2055] [2.2899] [2.8980] [1.2029] [2.2862] [2.9043] [1.2042] [2.2969] [2.9132] [1.1992] [2.2775] [2.8890] 
Market-to-book -0.4121* -1.1645** -1.1278 -0.3725* -1.0941** -1.0827 -0.3650* -1.0656** -1.0219 -0.3834* -1.0898** -1.0362 
 
[0.2188] [0.4918] [0.7257] [0.2098] [0.4952] [0.7653] [0.2134] [0.4850] [0.7384] [0.2120] [0.4890] [0.7402] 
IO 0.0669* 0.1807** 0.3831*** 0.0546 0.1552* 0.3588*** 0.0544 0.1516* 0.3493*** 0.0545 0.1514* 0.3486*** 
 
[0.0342] [0.0871] [0.1087] [0.0335] [0.0879] [0.1190] [0.0336] [0.0868] [0.1159] [0.0331] [0.0858] [0.1151] 
Insiders 0.0199 0.0673 0.0965 0.0215 0.072 0.1035 0.0227 0.0722 0.1007 0.0208 0.0701 0.0999 
 
[0.0248] [0.0639] [0.0773] [0.0249] [0.0647] [0.0786] [0.0250] [0.0640] [0.0766] [0.0245] [0.0630] [0.0760] 
Constant -8.2564 -2.4578 -8.2138 -6.5379 3.7927 2.618 -5.1164 2.9953 -3.423 -6.2414 2.1942 -2.8023 
  [7.4994] [17.0677] [25.5899] [7.2697] [16.2300] [25.4900] [7.6850] [16.6964] [25.0984] [7.3528] [16.4143] [24.8577] 
Adj. R-sq 0.0085 0.0172 0.0309 0.0075 0.0171 0.0386 0.0079 0.0153 0.0294 0.0091 0.0168 0.0302 
Observations 4133 4133 4133 4133 4133 4133 4133 4133 4133 4133 4133 4133 
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Appendix Table 1. 
Number of large institutional short-sale positions from the Tokyo Stock Exchange  
The Number of Positions are the number of large outstanding short positions during the month. Number of Covers is the 
number of disclosed positions that have been covered during the month. Number of Institutions is the number of unique 
active institutions that submit report for at least large outstanding short position and the Number of Stocks is the number 
of unique stocks that are included in the institutions’ reports during the month. 
Month 
Number of 
Positions  
Number of 
Covers 
Number of 
Institutions  
Number of 
Stocks 
200811 301 77 22 237 
200812 543 146 22 366 
200901 618 180 24 413 
200902 806 203 25 539 
200903 853 289 25 531 
200904 818 226 25 503 
200905 771 262 25 475 
200906 713 242 25 437 
200907 654 267 25 395 
200908 530 154 26 367 
200909 551 163 25 355 
200910 573 233 27 355 
200911 527 194 27 324 
200912 427 117 26 298 
201001 395 121 25 265 
201002 385 175 25 259 
201003 346 140 27 231 
201004 347 145 26 217 
201005 353 116 27 226 
201006 402 182 27 253 
201007 329 175 25 210 
201008 278 167 24 180 
201009 159 159 25 112 
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Appendix Table 2. 
List of active institutional short sellers 
Broker indicates whether the institution is a brokerage firm. Nbr. of Positions is the total number of large short positions 
reported during our sample period. Nbr. of Stocks is the number of unique stocks shorted and reported by the specific 
institution. Nbr. of Days is the total number of days the specific institutions had outstanding large short positions during 
our sample period. The Average Duration is the average duration in number of days for all reported large short positions. 
AveSize of Position is the average of the total shorted value across the positions in millions of yens, where the position 
value is the average shares shorted times the corresponding share price.  
Institution name Broker 
Nbr. of 
Positions 
Nbr. of 
Stocks 
Nbr. of 
Days 
Average 
Duration 
AveSize of 
Position 
UBS Securities Japan Yes 20 9 231 21.75 252.97 
Credit Suisse Hong Kong Yes 21 14 383 45.76 695.34 
Goldman Sachs, JP No 23 22 422 64.52 369.96 
Nomura Securities, JP Yes 27 22 127 6.74 210.95 
STAR L.P. No 29 19 275 30.66 273.31 
Citigroup Securities Yes 30 13 230 26.00 885.76 
Societe Generale Yes 32 19 149 8.38 828.55 
Deutsche Asset Management No 41 37 433 51.61 643.53 
Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated Yes 42 29 98 7.190 595.47 
Merrill Lynch Yes 46 31 382 45.46 1061.68 
Halberdier No 46 34 453 53.98 371.05 
Morgan Stanley MUFG JP Securities Yes 48 30 92 11.06 244.85 
Bridge Multi Managers Fund No 55 43 446 39.49 135.65 
Nomura Asset Management Hong Kong No 56 52 147 56.52 145.64 
Akito Master Fund No 58 50 237 36.86 111.39 
Nomura Asset Management Singapore No 70 63 303 58.49 139.76 
Mitsubishi UFJ Securities Yes 84 38 396 16.68 112.49 
Barclays Global Investors No 95 93 246 49.85 318.50 
AQR No 95 73 460 77.42 651.31 
Barclays Capital Securities Yes 107 48 382 10.60 555.17 
Mizuho Securities, JP Yes 116 41 458 21.37 872.78 
Morgan Stanley Securities Co Ltd 
(Japan) 
Yes 152 73 351 15.53 341.30 
ART International Holdings  No 152 61 396 19.73 190.00 
UBS, AG Yes 156 81 460 28.57 1100.40 
Bridgewater No 158 123 459 90.13 487.39 
Asian Management No 177 142 449 52.29 286.33 
Goldman Sachs, US No 278 134 459 32.94 860.37 
Credit Suisse Securities Yes 298 136 458 11.614 472.39 
Deutsche, DE Yes 551 234 458 15.55 720.70 
Morgan Stanley & Co. International Yes 572 338 460 46.94 773.34 
Citigroup Global Markets Financial 
Products 
No 636 471 458 64.87 368.27 
 
 
 
